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FOREWORD
How and when we die is partly determined by decisions made by the
courts, elected officials, and administrative agencies. Though we are far from
having a coherent public policy towards saving lives, there can be no question
that this objective has large and increasing influence in policy formulation.
Traditional public programs, such as investing in public health measures,
licensing physicians, sponsoring biomedical research, setting and enforcing
highway speed limits, and deterring negligence on the part of employers and
others through the law of torts, have been supplemented during the last de-
cade by a variety of important new initiatives which are at least in part jus-
tified by the objective of prolonging life. Consider, for example, the estab-
lishment of public financing of health care through Medicare and Medicaid,
the imposition of federal regulation to reduce air pollution, the establishment
of regulatory agencies to enhance the safety of consumer goods (the Con-
sumer Product Safety Administration) and the safety of the workplace (the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration), and the increasingly stringent
auto safety regulations imposed on manufacturers.
While much is currently being done to avert deaths, we have by no means
exhausted the possibilities for public action. Besides increasing the intensity of
effort in each of the existing arenas, we could move on to limiting the car-
cinogen content of cigarettes, requiring auto passengers to wear seat belts,
imposing strict regulations on the private ownership of handguns, and ban-
ning dangerous sports. Clearly, we are not doing everything possible to ex-
tend lives, and the principal explanation is equally clear: The policy objective
of saving lives is in conflict with other important policy objectives. Public
programs to reduce mortal risks are costly, either in terms of the economic
resources they consume-resources which could be allocated to improve ed-
ation, say, or increase private consumption--or in terms of infringing on
individual liberty. There is in effect a tradeoff between the quantity and qual-
ity of life. This tradeoff facing public decision makers has its parallel in house-
hold decisions: Most people would surely acknowledge that they could find
ways to reduce the health and safety hazards which endanger their lives, but
only by incurring unacceptable costs of pleasures foregone. It is perhaps more
troublesome to acknowledge this tradeoff in the public arena, and few public
officials would openly admit their willingness to sacrifice lives for the sake of
other valued objectives. But this symposium is motivated by the belief that the
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policy tradeoff between the quantity and quality of life should be openly ac-
knowledged, at least in discussions about public policy. In some circumstances
public policy decisions will and should have the effect of eschewing opportu-
nities to save some lives if the cost is too great. We could lower the national
speed limit to forty, require all new houses to be made fireproof, and order
everyone out to jog before breakfast, but common sense indicates otherwise.
If lifesaving is not to be given absolute priority over all other policy objec-
tives, then what procedures should be used to identify those lifesaving proj-
ects which are worthwhile? What program areas have the greatest potential
for worthwhile expansion of public efforts to save lives? How are Congress
and the courts likeh, to deal with the central issue of providing public financ-
ing for medical treatment in the case of catastrophic diseases, and how can
the competing objectives which impinge on this issue be reconciled? The six
articles in this sym1 )osium represent path-breaking research on these and re-
lated questions. Rather than summarize the articles, a task better left to the
authors themselves, we limit outselves here to highlighting some of the con-
mon strands of thought which cut across the articles.
To letermine whether some lifesaving program is worthwhile the costs
have to be weighed, in some fashion, against the benefits. Two articles
-Zeckhauser and Shepard's' and Acton's 2 -address this problem and com-
plement each other nicely. Zeckhauser and Shepard divide the major ques-
tions concerning cost/benefit analysis of lifesaving programs into four areas:
(1) prediction, (2) valuation, (3) accounting, and (4) the role of incentives and
information.3 Acton, dealing with the second issue, critiques the two dominant
schools of thought on how lives should be valued in public policy analysis and
makes a strong case that the procedure actuallx used in government cost-
benefit analyses is conceptually inferior to the alternative procedLire. Zeck-
hauser and Shepard focus on the remaining three areas. They too are critical
of current practices for evaluating lifesaving programs and suggest a number
of analytical improvements that should prove to be of considerable value.
One of the several conclusions reached by Zeckhauser and Shepard is
that the most common measure of the benefits of a lifesaving program-the
number of lives it can be expected to save-is an inadequate measure as lives
are never permanently "saved," but only prolonged. A program which delays
the death of one hundred terminally ill cancer patients by one year is surely not
worth as much as a program which saves one hundred y ouths from dy ing in
auto accidents. Furthermore, it max be desirable to make some adjustment for
the quality of the lives which are prolonged-a year of life for a person who is
1. Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at
5 (1976).
2. Acton, Valuing Livesaving Alternatives and Some Measurements, 40 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
no. 4, at 46 (1976).
3. Zeckhauser & Shepard, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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severely disabled and in pain is surely not worth as much as a year of health.
Zeckhauser and Shepard thus Suggest that the benefit is to be measured in
"quality-adjusted life-years saved."'4 Vaupel uses this important insight to
analyze the basic nature of the "death problem" in the United States.5 Vaupel
argues that there should be greater emphasis in public policy towards prolong-
ing life on reducing the incidence of early death-death before age sixty-five.
While most people die after age sixty-five, most of the quality adjusted life
years lost are due to deaths before this age. Under reasonable assumptions it
can be demonstrated that it would be worth many billions of dollars to reduce
the incidence of early death by even a few percentage points. Furthermore,
there is considerable evidence that a substantial rediction in the incidence of
early death is feasible. Early death differs in both causes and effects from the
problems of late death, and the analytical distinction between the two appears
to be a very helpful framework within which to evaluate public policy in this
area.
Three papers in the symp1 osium are focused on one )articLlarly difficult
policy arena-government programs to finance life-prolonging medical care. If
such programs have any limitations or exclusions, then some people will die
sooner than necessary simply for lack of necessary financial means. There are
two troublesome aspects to this problem which do not arise from public deci-
sionS to economize on, say, road safety or biomedical research. First, to with-
hold life-sustaining medical care for financial reasons is an overt and painful
contradiction of the important myth that life is priceless. Second, anything less
than unlimited public financing of medical care may result in wealthy patients
being provided with treatment which is at the same time denied to others. The
inequity of this arrangement reinforces the impetus for unlimited public
financing.
The response to these arguments, developed in the article by Havighurst,
Blumstein, and Bovbjerg,6 is that a program to provide unlimited public
financing for treatment of catastrophic disease would probably result in a
considerable and accelerating increase in the fraction of Gross National Prod-
uct devoted to medical expenditures, thereby reducing our ability to pursue
other national objectives-including, perhaps, our ability to invest in more
cost-effective programs to avert deaths. Havighurst, Blumstein, and Bovbjerg
make a number of suggestions for designing catastrophic medical care financ-
ing schemes which wN ould produce incentives for providers to economize while
not seriously violating either the myth that life is beyond price or ftindamen-
tal notions of equity. But these authors are not optimistic that Congress will
4. Id. at 11.
5. Vaupel, Earlv Death: An American Tragedy, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 73 (1976).
6. Havighurst, Blumstein, & Bovbjerg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 122 (1976).
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be able to resist effectively what they call the "lifesaving imperative" in design-
ing institutions to ration medical care.7
Rettig's article provides a fascinating account of the politics of catastrophic
disease financing.' He recounts the ten year national debate which resulted in
a congressional decision in 1972 to extend Medicare financing to all kidney
patients in need of renal dialysis. Dialysis is an expensive procedure for ex-
tending the lives of kidney patients a few years; typically the patient is in poor
health and largely incapacitated. The lack of consensus in the medical com-
munity, and the long delay in Congress before extending Medicare coverage,
may suggest that the "lifesaving imperative" is not irresistible.
Blumstein argues in his article9 that the ultimate form taken by catas-
trophic disease programs may be dictated at least in part by the courts. The
major qJuestions vet to be resolved are (1) whether the Constitution requires
the extension of public financing for catastrophic disease treatment, either
because of an equal protection argument (why should hemophiliacs be denied
the public assistance currently provided to renal patients?) or a more sweep-
ing "right to life" type argument; (2) whether the Constitution places restric-
tions on the process by which a decision is made to discontinue treatment for
a terminallx ill patient. 1 Blumstein argues, both here and in the Havighurst,
Blumstein, and Bo\ bjerg article, that the courts should adopt a low profile
with respect to such issues precisely because they are not an appropriate in-
stitution for balancing the claims of catastrophically ill patients against other
claims against the nation's economic resources.
The papers in this symposium were originally presented at a conference
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. The twenty-two participants in this
conference represented a variety of disciplines, including law, economics,
political science, applied mathematics, public policy, medicine, ethics, business,
and chemistry. Despite this diversity in backgrounC, there was a consensus
that in many policy areas efforts to save lives conflict with other valued objec-
tives, and that while life is precious it is not beyond price. Establishing intel-
lectual and institutional frameworks for making such vital decisions which are
sensitive to the claims of these competing objectives is a task of great difficuhty




7. Id. at 140, 41.
8. Rettig. The Policy Debate on Patient Care Financing.for Victims of End-Stage Renal Disease, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 196 (1976).
9. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and
Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 4, at 233 (1976).
10. Id. at 234, 35.
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